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I. INTRODUCTION
As the social and economic issues confronting our government have grown in
number and complexity, legislative efforts to address these concerns have focused
upon broad policy determinations. Consequently, legislatures have granted adminis-
trative agencies increasing authority over the implementation of these policies.
Depending upon the particular enabling statute, administrative agencies may have
authority to exercise legislative functions, judical functions, or both. Legislative
functions are manifested in rulemaking, which involves the formulation of future law
or policy; judicial functions are manifested in adjudicatory proceedings, which
determine past and present rights and liabilities.' This Comment is concerned
primarily with the rulemaking function of agencies.
The rulemaking authority of administrative agencies includes formulating,
amending, and repealing rules.2 Since this authority derives solely from the enabling
statute, the legislature retains the power to limit or even to abolish such authority. Yet
legislative supervision of administrative agencies through constant statutory modifi-
cation of their authority is cumbersome. Indirect supervision of administrative
1. See L. MoDirsKA, AD.mnamIATivE LAw: PRAcrc AND PRocEOuRE 11-18 (1982).
The Supreme Court characterizes the basic distinction between rulemaking and adjudication as follows: "While the
line dividing them may not always be a bright one . . . [there is] a recognized distinction in administrative law between
proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings designed
to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the other." United States v. Florida E.C.Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973).
2. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1982 & Supp. I1 1985); Omo R v. CODE ANN. § 119.03 (Page 1984 & Supp.
1986).
The federal Administrative Procedure Act defines "rule" as "the whole or any part of an agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency . S... 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982 & Supp. Ell 1985). See
also Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.01(C) (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986) (defining "rule" as "any rule, regulation, or standard,
having a general and uniform operation adopted, promulgated, and enforced by any agency under the authority of the laws
governing such agency, and . . . does not include any internal management rule of agency under the authority of the laws
governing such agency, and . . . does not include any internal management rule of an agency unless the internal
management rule affects private rights"); 2 K. DAvis, AD. amINrIAm LAw TREATsE § 7:1 (2d ed. 1978) ("One may say
with reasonable accuracy that 'rules' and 'regulations' are terms that are interchangeable . . . . mhe common term
'rules and regulations' seems clearly redundant."). As used in this Comment, "rules" and "regulations" will have
identical meanings.
Agency rules may be substantive, procedural, or interpretative. Substantive rules establish standards of conduct that
have the force and effect of law. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Procedural rules relate to internal
agency organization, practice, and procedure and are binding only upon the agencies themselves. Interpretive rules
represent an agency's interpretation of statutes and regulations, do not have the force of law, and are not binding. See
Marshall v. W. & W. Steel Co., 604 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1979). This Comment is concerned with substantive rules.
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agencies through legislative budgetary pressure as well as intense scrutiny of
executive appointments is equally unsatisfactory. 3
A popular procedure for maintaining some modicum of control over agency
rulemaking activities is the legislative veto. 4 With this mechanism, any grant of
rulemaking authority is conditioned upon subsequent legislative review. In a
bicameral legislature, there are four principal methods for structuring a legislative
veto: (1) agency action can be precluded if either house of the legislature passes a
resolution of disapproval; (2) agency action can be precluded if both houses pass a
resolution of disapproval; (3) agency action can become effective only with the
approval of either house; or (4) agency action can become effective only if approved
by both houses.5
While legislative veto provisions have been heralded as a pragmatic method for
restraining a burgeoning bureaucracy, 6 they have also been the targets of considerable
criticism. 7 In 1983, the United States Supreme Court, in Immigration and Natural-
ization Service v. Chadha,8 held that congressional use of the legislative veto violated
the constitutional requirements of presentment and bicameralism as well as the
doctrine of separation of powers. Although Chadha is only persuasive authority when
examining the validity of Ohio's legislative veto procedure, the approaches taken by
the various justices provide a useful analytical framework.
This Comment suggests that while the opinion of the Supreme Court in Chadha
properly rejected the modem practice of enacting legislation without adequate
standards to guide administrative agencies in promulgating rules, 9 it needlessly
3. See Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 557, 431 A.2d 783, 786-87 (1981).
4. For a discussion of the historical development of the legislative veto, see Ginnane, The Control of Federal
Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HAv. L. REv. 569 (1953); Newman & Keaton,
Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41 CAL. L. REv. 565
(1953); Comment, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CMAzw. L. REv. 983 (1975).
5. J. BoLro-, LEoiSLAuVE Vero: UNsEPARAmNG a PowEss 1-2 (1977). It is also possible to vest veto authority in
certain legislative committees, see infra text accompanying notes 113-15, or in specific individuals, see infra text
accompanying notes 118-20.
6. See generally Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on
Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Bosivert, A Legislative Tool for Supervision of Administrative
Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FosRDHiA L. REv. 638 (1957); Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the
Constitution, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 467 (1962); Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A
Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455 (1977); Melville, Legislative Control Over Administrative Rule Making,
32 U. Cm. L. REv. 33 (1963); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52
tID. L.J. 367 (1977); Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 351
(1978); Schwartz, Legislative Control ofAdministrative Rules and Regulations: The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1031 (1955); Stewart, Constitutionlity of the Legislative Veto, 13 HAv. J. oN lr ois. 593 (1976).
7. See generally Bruff & Gellhom, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative
Vetoes, 90 HI-sv. L. Rev. 1369 (1977); Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a
Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REv. 423 (1978); Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 HAv. J. oN
Lras. 735 (1979); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REv.
253 (1982); Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, 3 REo., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 19;
Comment, supra note 4.
8. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
9. See Bruff & Gellhom, supra note 7, at 1381-1409, 1426-28 (in five case studies of regulatory rulemaking,
Congress left key issues unresolved in the authorizing statutes and relied on the legislative veto mechanism to maintain
control over agency policy initiatives); Martin, supra note 7, at 268-71 (rather than make difficult policy choices
concemrinng the duty of local transit authorities to accomodate the disabled, Congress delegated this decision to the
Department of Transportation, subject to congressional veto of unpopular regulations).
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returned to the antiquated doctrine of absolute nondelegation.' 0 Since the underlying
concerns of the Chadha majority are alleviated by Ohio's legislative veto mechanism,
the reasoning behind that opinion should not be applied to invalidate the Ohio
procedure. This Comment traces the historical development of the nondelegation
doctrine" and then examines both Chadha'2 and relevant state decisions. 13 In
addition, the procedure for legislative review of agency rulemaking in Ohio is
reviewed' 4 and reasons for its continued use are articulated.' 5
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONDELEGATION DocTRaNE
The Constitution of the United States outlines three major aspects of govern-
mental power: legislative, executive, and judicial; and vests each in a separate organ
of government.' 6 While the Constitution plainly embodies a system of separate
power,' 7 it does not explicitly state the precise manner in which these powers are to
be separated.' 8 During the debates over the federal Constitution, a tension emerged
between the purist's belief that tyrannical abuses of authority could only be avoided
by the absolute separation of powers19 and the pragmatist's desire to accommodate
the realities of governing by requiring only that one branch not exercise the entire
power of another. 20 Decisions of the Supreme Court have made it clear that the
pragmatist's view has prevailed. 2'
10. See infra text accompanying notes 24-26, 85-87.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 16-42. The nondelegation doctrine refers to the principle used by courts to
constrain the transfer of legislative authority to administrative agencies. The term is synonymous with the delegation
doctrine.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 43-87.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 88-130.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 131-55.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 156-98.
16. See U.S. Co.sT. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress .. "); U.S. CoNST. art. n1, § I, cl. I ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President. ... ); U.S. CoNsr.
art. l9I, § 1, cl. I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts ....").
17. See supra note 16. See also A. VrAnsrsn, Ti DocTiEs OF SPA ATIoN OF PowERs AND rrs PrmErr DAY
Sit.a'mccE (1953); Parker, The Historical Basis ofAdministrative Law: Separation of Powers and Judicial Supremacy,
12 RuroGs L. Rsv. 449 (1958); Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers", 2 U. Cm. L.
REv. 385 (1935).
18. Cf. MAss. Cossr. of 1780, art. XXX:
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and
judicial powers, or either of them; The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial, or either of
them; The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive, or either of them; to the end it may be a
government of laws and not of men.
19. See, e.g., B. DEocrOrs~umu, THE Spmrr OF TH LAws 202 (D. Carrithers ed. 1977):
When the legislative and executive powers are united . . . in the same body, then there can be no
liberty; . . . lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, [and] execute them in a tyrannical
manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
control; for thejudge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, thejudge might behave
with all the violence of an oppressor. Miserable indeed would be the case . . . were the same body . . . to
exercise those powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the
crimes or differences of individuals.
20. See Tr FEo usrs No. 47 (J. Madison) (arguing that the Constitution prohibits only the exercise by one branch
of the whole power of another); THE FsBosnsj-r No. 48 (. Madison) ("IT]he powers properly belonging to one of the
departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of one of the other departments.").
21. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) ("IThe Constitution by no means contemplates total separation
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This view of the separation of powers is expressed in the doctrine of
nondelegation, which provides that the powers of one branch of government should
not be wholly delegated to another branch. 22 Although nondelegation theoretically
applies to any transfer of governmental power to a coordinate branch, it has figured
most prominently in the transfer of legislative power to the executive branch. 23
The delegation of legislative power is an old concern, predating the federal
Constitution and even the principle of separation of powers. According to John
Locke, the legislature was prohibited from transfering its authority to make laws to
anyone else:
The power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a positive voluntary
grant... can be no other than what the positive grant conveyed, which being only to make
Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to transfer their
Authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.2 4
Locke's insistence that legislators could not delegate their authority derived from the
rule of agency law that power transferred by a principal to an agent cannot be
redelegated by the agent, since such a redelegation would conflict with the original
transfer. 25 Under such a principle of absolute nondelegation, 26 the legislature may not
delegate to the executive any discretionary authority regarding policy determinations.
Thus, the role of the legislature is to make all policy determinations, and the role of
the executive is limited to the mechanical enforcement of laws enacted by the
legislature.
Prior to Chadha, the United States Supreme Court had never embraced this
principle of absolute nondelegation when assessing the extent to which the legislature
could permissibly delegate some of its authority to the executive branch. Initially, the
Supreme Court upheld delegations of legislative power to the executive on the
rationale that the transferred authority was limited to making a factual determina-
tion,27 to acting on a specific contingency, 28 or to filling in certain details pertinent
of each of these three essential branches of Government . . . . [A] hermetic sealing off of the three branches of
government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.");
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("While the Constitution
diffuses power to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separation but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
22. See L. JAISE, JUDICIAL CosmOL OF AmunssmmaiVE AcnON 28-33 (1965); Aranson, Gelhom & Robinson, A
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CoRNu. L. Rav. 1 (1982). Yet separation of powers and nondelegation are not
completely synonymous since the doctrine of separation of powers can be violated in ways that do not involve delegation.
For example, alleged usurpations of powers belonging to one branch of government by a coordinate branch may violate
the separation of powers principle but do not necessarily involve delegations of power. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (the grant of authority to determine program-by-program budget reductions to the
comptroller general constituted an unconstitutional usurpation by Congress of executive branch functions).
23. See Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 22, at 3-4.
24. J. LocKE, Ssco.,,o TREAsnsE oF CVL Govamumr T 141 (1690).
25. See Aranson, Gelihom & Robinson, supra note 22, at 4.
26. The term "absolute nondelegation" is used to describe the principle that each branch of government is strictly
precluded from delegating any of its authority to a coordinate branch. See generally I K. DAvIs, AD.amsTxArva L-w
TRsaase § 3:10 (2d ed. 1978); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power (pts. I & I), 47 CoLutm. L. Rev. 359,
561 (1947).
27. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (upholding a provision of the Tariff Act of 1890 authorizing the President
to suspend favorable tariff treatment for nations that subjected American goods to "any duties or other
exactions . . .which . . . [he] may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonably .. ").
28. The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 386 (1813) (rejecting an argument that a statute authorizing the
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to the legislative purpose.29 The Court subsequently opted to enforce the spirit of
separation of powers by enforcing the standards requirement, which permitted the
delegation of legislative powers to administrative agencies30 only if reasonably
specific standards accompanied the grant of authority. 31 Thus, whenever Congress
"shall lay down... an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized
to ... [proceed] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power.''32 Moreover, the standards must be "sufficiently
definite and precise" to provide a reviewing court with the ability "to ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed." '33 During the New Deal era, the
Supreme Court invalidated congressional delegation of legislative authority to
executive agencies on three separate occasions for lack of specific standards.3 4
During this period, the nondelegation doctrine became identified with other theories,
such as substantive due process and a restrictive reading of the commerce clause,
used by the Court to invalidate reform legislation. 35 When many of these decisions
were subsequently overruled and the underlying theories discredited, the nondelega-
tion principle was relegated to "fugitive existence." '3 6
As a result, the Supreme Court has not invalidated any federal legislation on the
basis of an impermissible delegation of legislative authority during the past fifty
years.3 7 Indeed, the Court has refrained from invalidating delegations of legislative
power even when explicit standards were lacking. 38 The lax enforcement of the
President to terminate a trade embargo on France and England if the two nations ceased violating "the neutral commerce
of the United States" delegated too much discretion to the executive branch).
29. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (upholding the authorization of the Secretary of Agriculture
to promulgate riles governing the use of national forests).
30. See J. CoM.iR, LEISLArive FuNcToNs oF NATONAL Aumesm.rT&nE ArHonEs 15-17 (1927) (the advantages of
delegating legislative power to administrative agencies are: greater knowledge of what will work; increased speed; more
flexibility; greater permanence, continuity, and scientific value; and additional saving of legislature's time for general
policy making).
31. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the
national Legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress
the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down
policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules
within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to
apply.
Id. at 421.
32. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
33. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944).
34. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). These remain the only cases in which the nondelegation
doctrine has been explicitly used to invalidate federal legislation.
35. See R.H. JAcxsom, THE SruGiGLE FOR JutcnAL SUPRBMACY 48-123 (1949).
36. Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 22, at 22. Although the nondelegation principle fell from judicial
favor, commentators did not completely abandon it. See J. ELY, DLocRAcy AND Dms'msr 131-34 (1980); Scalia, A Note
on the Benzene Case, 4 Ro., July-Aug. 1980, at 25, 27-28.
37. J. MAs w & R. Moumu., AomuasiA-wv LAw: THE Amasucss PuBuc LAw SysmB,--C .sEs mx MA~asALs 6 (2d ed.
1985).
38. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (upholding a grant of essentially standardless power to
the Secretary of the Interior to apportion the waters of the Colorado River); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742,
783-87 (1948) (upholding the Renegotiation Act, which granted executive agencies authority to recover "excessive
profits" from defense contractors without explictly defining the term "excessive"); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
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standards requirement has been primarily an acknowledgement that meaningful
standards are not feasible in every circumstance, and that it is not possible to develop
standards for unforeseeable situations. The effect of the Court's limited application of
the standards requirement has been to facilitate the congressional enactment of
legislation lacking any meaningful standards. 39
In Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute,4° however,
some members of the Court expressed a willingness to resurrect the nondelegation
principle. 41 It was in this changing climate of broad legislative delegations of
discretionary authority to administrative agencies and of increasing judicial rumblings
in favor of reviving the nondelegation principle that the Supreme Court considered
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.42
M. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE V. CHADHA
Jagdish Rai Chadha was an East Indian, who came to the United States in 1966
on a student visa and then stayed beyond its expiration.43 While technically
deportable, Mr. Chadha sought to have his deportation suspended pursuant to the
Immigration and Nationality Act.44 Under the provisions of the Act, the United States
Attorney General could suspend the deportation of certain qualifying aliens.45 The
States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding a statute authorizing the Federal Communications Commission to license
radio communications "as public convenience, interest or necessity requires").
39. See, e.g., The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, §§ 3001-11, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-31 (1982
& Supp. 1987) (granting authority on the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate the generation,
transportation, treatment, and disposal of all "hazardous materials," without defining "hazardous materials"). See also
supra note 9.
40. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). This case is frequently referred to as the Benzene Case.
41. In the Benzene Case, the Court considered a provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Act that required the Secretary of Labor to set exposure limits for toxic materials in the workplace that would "most
adequately assure, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment" of his or her health.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act of 1970, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The
plurality opinion invoked the nondelegation doctrine to justify its interpretation of a statutory section defining occupational
safety standards as conditions "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment." 29 U.S.C.
§ 652(8) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The plurality warned that unless the definition was read to include a requirement that
OSHA act only to eliminate significant risks, the agency would be limited only by the remaining statutory constraint of
feasibility. Because that interpretation would give OSHA the power to impose enormous clean-up costs, the plurality
feared that "such a sweeping delegation of legislative power . . . might be unconstitutional under the Court's
[nondelegation doctrine]." Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). Justice
Rehnquist in a separate concurrence explicitly held that the statutory provision violated the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at
672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Furthermore, in American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), the Court decided that the statutory
reference to "feasibility" did not require a cost-benefit anlaysis to justify imposition of an exposure standard for cotton
dust. Id. at 509. The dissent argued that the statutory provision violated the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 543 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). See Pierce & Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 59 TEx. L. Rv. 1175, 1204 n. 176
(1981).
42. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
43. Id. at 923.
44. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982
& Supp. 1987)). This legislation was enacted in response to the common congressional practice in the 1930's of passing
private immigration bills to allow certain aliens to remain in the country. See B. CR.io, TiE LEr<mxAw VETO:
CONGRESSIONAL CONROL OF RanuLAsoN 34 (1983).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982 & Supp. 1987). This section provides:
Mhe Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . [when the alien is deportable for reasons other than criminal
or subversive activity and has been present in the United States for seven years] and proves that during all of
such period he was and is a person of good moral character, and is a person whose deportation would, in the
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suspension would be effective, however, only if neither the House of Representatives
nor the Senate approved a resolution repudiating the suspension during the following
two sessions of Congress. 46
On June 25, 1974, an immigration judge of the Department of Justice's Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS), found that Mr. Chadha satisfied the re-
quirements for a compassionate suspension of deportation. 47 As required by the statute,
the Attorney General, through the INS, transmitted to Congress a report of its order
suspending the deportation of Mr. Chadha. 48 On December 12, 1975, one week before
the statutory time period would have expired and Mr. Chadha would have been granted
permanent resident alien status, House Resolution 926 was introduced. 49 The reso-
lution stated that "the House of Representatives does not approve of granting per-
manent residence in the United States to the aliens hereinafter named. "50 Mr. Chadha
and five others were specifically named and the resolution was subsequently approved
without debate or significant explanation. 51 The effect of the resolution's passage was
to reinstate the prior deportation order. When an INS hearing was held to implement
the order, Mr. Chadha moved to terminate the proceeding on grounds that the House
action was unconstitutional. 52 Following the dismissal of his claim, Mr. Chadha
appealed his case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 53
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Act's legislative veto procedure violated
the constitutional principle of separation of powers since it operated as "a prohibited
legislative intrusion upon the executive and judicial branches.' 54 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied upon an analytical framework previously established by
the Supreme Court. 55 Recognizing that the test to be applied was a "functional"
one, 56 the Ninth Circuit held that the legislative veto accorded Congress powers
central to its coordinate branches; 57 that congressional exercise of these powers would
disrupt the other branches' performance of their duties;58 and that such a reallocation
of power was not necessary to implement any valid governmental policy.59
opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who
is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1111987).
47. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 924 (1983).
48. Id.
49. 121 CoNG. REc. 40,247 (1975).
50. H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 Co.G. Rsc. 40,800 (1975).
51. See id.
52. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983).
53. Id.
54. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Servs., 634 F.2d 408, 420 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).
55. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 441-46 (1977) (in determining whether the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches of
government, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which the Act prevents the executive branch from accomplishing
its constitutionally assigned functions; if the potential for disruption is present, it must be determined whether that impact
is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress).
56. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 429 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).
57. Id. at 430.
58. Id. at 431.
59. Id. at 432-33.
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The Supreme Court, however, ignored the functional approach to separation-
of-powers issues endorsed in previous decisions. ° Instead, Chief Justice Burger's
opinion of the Court hinged upon characterizing the House passage of the resolution
as a "legislative act," and thus subject to the formal requirements of article I of the
Constitution. 61
Focusing solely on the identity of the actor, the majority opinion presumed that
the veto was an exercise of legislative power.62 The Court then proceeded to state the
circumstances that rendered the veto "legislative in its character and effect.' 63 In the
majority's view, Mr. Chadha would have remained in the United States absent House
action. 64 Passage of the resolution, therefore, effectively mandated Mr. Chadha's
deportation. Since the House action "had the purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons... outside the legislative branch," the
majority concluded that the action was legislative in character. 65
After classifying the House passage of the resolution as legislative in character,
the Court asserted that the action must satisfy the requirements of presentment and
bicameralism, unless specifically exempted under the Constitution. 66 Since the
one-house legislative veto was not specifically excepted by the Constitution, failure
to comply with presentment and bicameralism rendered the procedure unconstitu-
tional. 67 Moreover, by basing its decision on presentment and bicameralism con-
cerns, the majority's decision seemingly invalidated every use of the legislative veto.
Indeed, less than two weeks later, the Court summarily affirmed two appellate court
decisions invalidating other congressional legislative vetoes.68
60. See supra note 55.
61. The principal procedural requirements for enacting legislation are approval by both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate as well as presentment to the President for approval or possible veto. See U.S. Cox.r. art. I, § 1,
cl. 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives."); U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House
of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States...").
See also Goldsmith, INS v. Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A Speculation, 15 SvmcusE L. Ra. 749, 752
(1984). Professor Goldsmith suggests the Court's reasoning took the form of a simple syllogism-major premise: when
Congress engages in "law making" it may do so only in accordance with the procedural requirements of article I; minor
premise: the exercise of the legislative veto was "law making" that did not comply with article I; conclusion: the exercise
of the legislative veto was unconstitutional.
62. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-52 (1983). ("When any Branch acts, it
is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it . . . When the Executive acts, it presumptively
acts in an executive or administrative capacity. . . .And when, as here, one House of Congress purports to act, it is
presumptively acting within its assigned sphere.").
63. Id. at 952.
64. Id.
65. Id. The majority also cited as evidence of the legislative character of the House's action the policy-making
nature of the decision to deport Mr. Chadha. Id. at 954.
66. Although the majority recognized that "[n]ot every action taken by either House is subject to the bicameralism
and presentment requirements of Article I," id. at 952; it noted that exceptions from bicameralism and presentment were
limited to four provisions in the Constitution: the power of the House of Representatives to initiate impeachments, U.S.
Co,;sr art I, § 2, cl. 5; the power of the Senate to conduct trials following impeachment and to convict following trial,
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; the power of the Senate to approve or to disapprove Presidential appointments, U.S. Co.T.
art. I, § 2, cl. 2; the power of the Senate to ratify treaties negotiated by the President, U.S. Cossr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
67. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
68. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), aff'g Consumer
Energy Counceil of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States Senate v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 463
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In a separate concurrence, Justice Powell resolved the case in a less sweeping
manner. In his view, the doctrine of separation of powers could be violated in two
ways. One branch could impermissibly interfere with another's performance of
constitutionally assigned functions, 69 or one branch could assume a function that is
more properly entrusted to another. 70 By focusing on the nature of the House's
decision-'"that six specific persons did not comply with certain statutory criteria"--
Justice Powell concluded that the House assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to
the courts. 7' Thus, in determining that particular persons did not satisfy the
requirements for permanent residence in this country, the House "assumed a judicial
function in violation of the principle of separation of powers." 72
Dissenting, Justice White disputed the majority's contention that all exercises of
legislative power are required to comply with presentment and bicameralism. 73 In his
view, "[i]f the effective functioning of a complex modem government requires the
delegation of vast authority which, by virtue of its breadth, is legislative or
'quasi-legislative' in character, I cannot accept that Article I... should forbid
Congress to qualify that grant with a legislative veto." 74 Moreover, Justice White felt
that the legislative veto procedure in question preserved the interests of bicameralism
and presentment because a permanent change in a deportable alien's status could be
accomplished only with the concurrence of the House, the Senate, and the executive
branch. 75
Justice White was equally troubled by the practical effect of the majority
opinion. 76 He perceived the legislative veto as a valuable tool for facilitating the
delegation of limited legislative powers in the modem administrative state. 77
According to Justice White,
[w]ithout the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to refrain
from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing with
U.S. 1216 (1983), aff'g Consumers Union v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982). At issue in these
cases were rulemaking by executive and independent agencies as well as a two-house legislative veto.
69. See, e.g., Nixon v. AdministratorofGen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 433 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974).
70. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952); Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
71. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 965 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 960. Cf. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative
Veto Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J. 789, 803-04 (suggesting that Justice Powell did not find the statute objectionable on the
basis of an infringement of judicial power, but rather on the grounds that forcing Mr. Chadha to submit to the possibility
of an adverse congressional judgment about the facts of his particular case would be decidedly unfair and contrary to the
principle of protecting citizens against governmental tyranny).
73. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 984 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("The
Court's holding today that all legislative-type action must be enacted through the lawmaking process ignores that
legislative authority is routinely delegated to the Executive Branch, to the independent regulatory agencies, and to private
individuals and groups.").
74. Id. at 989.
75. Id. at 990-97.
76. Id. at 1002 ("Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress
than the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history.").
77. Id. at 972-73 ("Mhe legislative veto is more than 'efficient, convenient, and useful.' It is an important if not
indispensable political invention that allows the President and Congress to resolve major constitutional and policy
differences, assures the accountability of independent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress' control over
lawmaking.").
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the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy
landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking function to the Executive Branch
and independent agencies. To choose the former leaves major national problems unresolved;
to opt for the latter risks unaccountable policy-making by those not elected to fill that role.78
While the result reached by the majority in Chadha severely restricted Congress'
ability to legislate effectively, 79 the majority's reasoning is also susceptible to attack.
For instance, the characterization of the House action as "altering legal rights" begs
the question in Mr. Chadha's case. In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion
assumes that the Attorney General's suspension of Mr. Chadha's deportation is
distinct from the House adoption of the resolution. When so perceived, the passage
of the resolution repeals existing legal rights. Yet under the statutory scheme enacted
by Congress,80 Mr. Chadha's right to remain in the United States could be conferred
only if the Attorney General so recommended and only if neither house of Congress
exercised its review power. Between the suspension of the deportation and the end of
the time period for legislative oversight, Mr. Chadha had no legal right to remain in
the country. In this context, the House's passage of the resolution no more altered
previously existing legal rights than the Attorney General's decision not to suspend
deportation. Thus, the majority's claim that Mr. Chadha acquired a legal right that the
House allegedly took away merely asserts its own assumption.8
Furthermore, the definition of legislative act adopted by the majority has been
sharply criticized as functionally inadequate.8 2 The characteristic cited by the Court
as indicative of legislative acts, the "altering of legal rights," hardly distinguishes
legislative acts from those of the executive or judiciary. Courts alter legal rights,
duties, and relations of persons when they pronounce their judgments, as do
executive officials when they enforce the laws. Thus, the alteration of legal rights
does not in a functional sense differentiate between the actions of the legislature and
those of the coordinate branches of government.
Moreover, the majority's equating of "altering legal rights" with the legislative
requirements of presentment and bicameralism has not been demonstrated in practice.
For example, congressional acts that alter legal rights, even if done in accordance
with article I prescriptions, will not be permitted if a court determines that the acts are
not legislative in character. 83 In addition, Congress has the recognized, albeit limited,
78. Id. at 968.
79. Shortly after the Chadha decision, the House overwhelmingly adopted a bill replacing the requirement that
rules adopted by the Consumer Product Safety Commission be subject to the possiblity of a legislative veto with two less
desirable alternatives. The first alternative was that no rule would become effective until enacted by Congress in statutory
form (thereby essentially depriving the Commission of its rulemaking authority and burdening Congress with the
responsibility to adopt rules); and the second was that proposed rules could not take effect for a period of ninety
"legislative days," during which Congress could enact a statute of disapproval (thereby prolonging the procedure for
potentially indefinite periods). H.R. 2668, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CoNG. Rc. H4758-84 (1983).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
81. See Strauss, supra note 72, at 796.
82. See Strauss, supra note 72, at 794-804; Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name, 21
H v. J. oN Lyon. 1, 9-10 (1984). The Court's definition of legislative act has also been criticized as resulting from an
arbitrarily strict construction of the text of the Constitution. See Smolla, Bring Back the Legislative Veto: A Proposal for
a Constitutional Amendment, 37 Ac. L. Rv. 509, 515-16 (1983); Note, INS v. Chadha: The Future Demise of
Legislative Delegation and the Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 11 J. Lzes. 317, 334-35 (1984).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) ("[L]egislative acts, no matter what their form,
[Vol. 49:251
1988] LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES
authority to act in ways that alter legal rights and duties of persons outside the
legislative branch without resorting to bicameral action or presentment. For example,
in both the investigation of possible legislation and the exercise of oversight
functions, Congress has authority to command the presence of witnesses and to attach
consequences to their failure to cooperate. 84
Finally, characterizing the House action as "altering legal rights" presumes the
reassertion of the doctrine of absolute nondelegation. 85 Since the characteristic
"altering legal rights" does not meaningfully distinguish between legislative and
executive actions, 86 it can only define legislative action when the nondelegation
principle is so strictly applied that executive action is restricted to the mere
mechanical enforcement of the law. Yet absolute nondelegation expressly contradicts
the premise underlying the modem administrative state that the executive branch may
exercise discretion in implementing legislative policy. 87
IV. STATE JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONCERNING THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
The highest courts in six states have considered the constitutionality of their
respective procedures for legislative review of agency rulemaking. 88 While there is
virtual unanimity in their opinion that the legislative veto is unconstitutional, the
reasons for reaching this conclusion vary. Generally, the decisions tend to stress either
or both of the principles alluded to in Chad/a, namely presentment 89 and separation
of powers. 90
The first state to consider the constitutionality of its legislative veto procedure
within the context of agency rule review was Alaska. 91 The statute at issue permitted
that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment
on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution.").
84. See Strauss, supra note 72, at 795. See also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (congressional
investigatory power described as a necessary and inevitable adjunct of the legislative process).
85. Several commentators have recognized the importance of absolute nondelegation to the Court's reasoning. See
Goldsmith, supra note 61, at 751-61; Note, Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: Defining a Restricted Legislative
Veto, 94 YA.E L.J. 1493, 1501-02 (1985). For a discussion of the doctrine of absolute nondelegation, see supra text
accompanying notes 24-26.
86. See supra text accompanying note 82.
87. See Note, supra note 85, at 1498.
88. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980), see infra text accompanying notes 91-94; State
ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 236 Kan. 45, 687 P.2d 622 (1984), see infra text accompanying
notes 95-98, 103-07; Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984), see infra text accompanying
notes 126-30; Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 431 A.2d 783 (1981), see infra text accompanying notes 118-25;
General Assembly of the State of New Jersey v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 448 A.2d 438 (1982), see infra text accompanying
notes 98-102, 108-12; State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981), see infra text accompanying
notes 113-17.
See also Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815 (D.C. 1985) (striking down provisions of the Home Rule Act that
allowed Congress to invalidate certain actions taken by the District of Columbia govemment); cf. Maloney v. Pac, 183
Conn. 313, 439 A.2d 349 (1981) (avoiding a decision as to the constitutionality of the legislative veto by holding that
municipal traffic regulations are not subject to review by the state Legislative Regulation Review Committee); Holly Care
Center v. State Dept. of Employ., 714 P.2d 45, 51 (Idaho 1986) (specifically declining to address the constitutionality
of a legislative veto, holding only that legislative approval of an administrative rule has no binding legal effect upon a
court).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
91. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980). Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 96 N.H. 517, 83
A.2d 738 (1950) (statute which provided that an executive reorganization plan proposed by the governor would become
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the legislature to invalidate an agency rule through the adoption of a concurrent
resolution. 92 Since the statute did not include any standards for the review of agency
rules, the legislature could invalidate rules for any reason.
The Alaska Supreme Court, in a three-two decision, held that when the state
legislature wishes to "take action having a binding effect on those outside the
legislature" it may do so only by following the enactment procedures set forth in the
state constitution. 93 In the case before it, the court found, seemingly by assumption,
that the repeal of revenue commission rules concerning prize limits awarded by
charitable organizations in fundraising lotteries constituted a legislative act. Since the
adoption of the concurrent resolution invalidating these rules violated state constitu-
tional provisions governing the mechanics of enacting legislation, the court con-
cluded that the legislative veto statute was unconstitutional. 94
The Kansas and New Jersey Supreme Courts also explictly relied upon
constitutional requirements concerning the mechanics of legislative enactment in
declaring their respective states' legislative veto provisions unconstitutional. Under
the Kansas procedure, the legislature had total and absolute control to adopt, modify,
reject, or revoke administrative rules and regulations by concurrent resolution. 95
Citing Chadha, the Kansas Supreme Court classified the adoption of such a resolution
as a legislative act since the legal rights and duties of persons outside the legislative
branch would be affected. 96 Because a resolution's passage would fail to comply with
the legislative enactment prescriptions in the Kansas Constitution, the procedure was
declared in violation of the state presentment clause. 97
Similar reasoning was employed in the consideration of New Jersey's legislative
veto procedure. The New Jersey Legislative Oversight Act98 required nearly every
rule proposed by a state agency to be submitted to the legislature. The proposed rule
was then referred to a standing committee that had forty-five days in which to report
its recommendation to the full house. 99 A rule was deemed approved unless the
legislature adopted a concurrent resolution nullifying the rule within sixty days of its
receipt.1° ° The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the legislature's power to
block the effectiveness of any promulgated rule was equivalent to amending or
repealing existing law. 101 Since legislative action could not have substantial policy-
law only if the state legislature did not disapprove the plan by concurrent resolution was declared in violation of the
enactment provisions of the state constitution).
92. ALAsKA STAr. § 44.62.320(a) (1984 & 1986 Supp.) ("The legislature, by a concurrent resolution adopted by
a vote of both houses, may annul a regulation of an agency or department.").
93. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 773 (Alaska 1980).
94. Id. at 770. Cf. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769,780 (Alaska 1980) (Boochever, C.J., dissenting)
(since the adoption of agency rules is not subject to the constitutonal requirements applicable to legislation, it is
inconsistent to demand these formalities when invalidating agency rules by resolutions).
Both the I 1th and 13th Alaska legislatures proposed state constituional amendments to permit a legislative veto. The
Alaska voters rejected the proposals in the 1980 and 1984 elections. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.320(a) (1984 & 1986 Supp.).
95. KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 77-426 (1965) amended by 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 1347-49.
96. State ex rel Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 236 Kan. 45, 64, 687 P.2d 622, 638 (1984).
97. Id.
98. N.J. STAT. ANNs. 99 52:14B-4.1-52:14B-4.9 (West 1986).
99. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-4.2 (West 1986).
100. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-4.3 (vest 1986).
101. General Assembly of the State of N.J. v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 388, 448 A.2d 438, 444 (1982).
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making effect without a majority vote of both houses of the legislature and the
approval of the Governor, the Legislative Oversight Act was held to violate the
presentment clause of the New Jersey Constitution.10 2
Yet both the Kansas and New Jersey Supreme Courts adopted a two-fold
analysis, basing their invalidation of the legislative veto procedures upon separation
of powers principles as well as presentment clause concerns. In determining whether
the Kansas procedure 0 3 established a violation of the separation of powers doctrine,
the Kansas Supreme Court considered four factors: "(a) the essential nature of the
power being exercised; (b) the degree of control by one department over another; (c)
the objective sought to be attained by the legislature; and (d) the practical result of the
blending of powers as shown by actual experience over a period of time."' 1 4 In
applying this functional analysis, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the power to
promulgate rules was essentially executive or administrative in nature, not legisla-
tive.105 Moreover, the court also ruled that the apparent objectives and actual results
of the procedure were to vest "total and absolute control" in the legislature over the
modification, rejection, or revocation of agency rules as well as to exclude executive
branch participation in this area. 106 Upon consideration of these factors, the court
concluded that the legislative veto procedure constituted a significant interference by
the legislative branch with executive branch functions and consequently was an
unconstitutional violation of separation of powers. 107
The Supreme Court of New Jersey similarly found that the Legislative Oversight
Act'0 8 was an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers.109 By empowering
the legislature to revoke virtually all proposed agency rules, the court concluded that
this Act allowed the legislature to intrude upon the chief function of executive
agencies-the implementation of statutes through the adoption of regulations."l 0 The
New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly stated, however, that the separation of powers
doctrine permits some legislative oversight and participation in executive action:
"Our holding here does not foreclose all legislative veto provisions."'' In the
court's view, when legislative action is necessary to further a statutory scheme
requiring cooperation between the legislative and executive branches and such action
presents no interference with exclusive executive functions, a legislative veto passes
constitutional muster. 112
102. Id.
103. See supra text accompanying note 95.
104. State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 236 Kan. 45, 59-60, 687 P.2d 622, 635 (1984)
(citing State ex rel. v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976)).
105. State ex reL Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 236 Kan. 45, 60, 687 P.2d 622, 635 (1984).
[The power to adopt rules] is delegated to the executive branch by law. This is not to say the legislature cannot
modify the statute which grants an agency the authority to adopt regulations. Once the legislature delegated by
law a function to the executive, it may only revoke that authority by the proper enactment of another law ....
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
109. General Assembly of the State of N.J. v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 385, 448 A.2d 438, 444 (1982).
110. Id. at 386, 448 A.2d at 443.
111. Id. at 395, 448 A.2d at 448.
112. Id. See, e.g. Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 90 N.J. 396, 448 A.2d 449 (1982) (approving the legislative
veto provisions included in the New Jersey Building Authority Act; the veto powers at issue were limited to the approval
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A slightly different procedure for agency rule review confronted the West
Virginia Supreme Court in a case involving the repeal of surface mining and
reclamation regulations. 11 3 Under the challenged procedure, an agency rule would
not become effective until it had been presented to the Legislative Rule-Making
Review Committee. 1 4 The committee, comprised of twelve legislators, had six
months from the date of presentation in which to approve or disapprove the proposed
regulation. While the legislature was authorized either to sustain or to reverse the
committee's action, it was not required to do so. Thus, the committee's decision to
veto a proposed rule, although technically only a recommendation to the full
legislature, was usually final." 5
In holding the procedure invalid, the West Virginia Supreme Court stated that
when the legislature exercises its power to void or amend administrative rules, it must
act collectively rather than as a committee." 6 The court specifically recognized that
not all legislative review of agency rulemaking is necessarily invalid:
Legislative rule-making review has purpose and merit and may be beneficially exercised and
employed when contained within its proper and constitutional sphere .... We do not
question that some procedure for review of agency rules and regulations may well be
warranted, but we must require that it be done within the limits of the separation of powers
doctrine and according to the system of checks and balances in our governmental
framework." 7
Similar concerns about the wholesale shifting of legislative power were raised in
a decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court. 1 8 There, the New Hampshire
House of Representatives asked the court to render an advisory opinion concerning
the constitutionality of legislation that would establish a procedure for legislative
review, and either acceptance or rejection, of rules proposed by state administrative
agencies. Under the plan, an administrative agency would be required to notify the
legislative leadership whenever it contemplated the promulgation of new rules. The
proposed rules would then be submitted to a standing committee in each house of the
legislature. If the proposed rules were neither approved nor rejected by a quorum of
both committees within thirty days of their submission, they would be deemed
approved. 1 9 The president of the senate and the speaker of the house of represen-
tatives, however, could agree to waive the requirement of committee approval, in
which case the rule would become effective without any committee review whatso-
ever. 120
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled that the proposed legislation was
unconstitutional because it delegated legislative authority to a smaller legislative
or rejection of building projects and leases that required continuing legislative support and thus were distinguishable from
the sweeping "revoke at will" provisions of the Legislative Oversight Act).
113. State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E. 2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
114. W. VA. CoDE § 29A-3-11 (1986).
115. State ex rel Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 632-33 (W. Va. 1981).
116. Id. at 633.
117. Id. at 634-35.
118. Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 431 A.2d 783 (1981).
119. Id. at 555-56, 431 A.2d at 785.
120. Id. at 559, 431 A.2d at 788.
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body. 121 "Although the legislature may delegate a portion of the legislative authority
to an administrative agency .... it may not delegate its lawmaking authority to a
smaller legislative body and thereby evade the [constitutional requirements] for
action .... "1122
While holding the creation of this particular legislative veto provision to be
unconstitutional, the court stated that a legislative veto is not per se unconstitutional.
The court acknowledged that New Hampshire law permitted the legislature to
delegate the power to promulgate rules necessary for the proper execution of the laws
to administrative agencies. 123 In the court's view, the rulemaking authority that may
be delegated by the legislature is limited to the filling in of details necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the statute. Since the legislature may delegate some of its
lawmaking authority to administrative agencies, the court concluded that the
legislature may properly condition the exercise of this authority upon legislative
approval.124 Thus, the New Hampshire Supreme Court explictly recognized that the
separation of powers doctrine can act to restrain executive authority to promulgate
rules, since that authority derives solely from a legislative grant. 125
The Kentucky Supreme Court took a slightly different approach to the separation
of powers principle in its analysis of the legislative veto. 126 The legislative oversight
procedure enacted by the Kentucky General Assembly provided that no rule
promulgated by an administrative body could become effective until it had been
approved by the seven-member Legislative Research Committee (LRC), or until it
had been placed before and not rejected by the General Assembly. 127 The statute also
required that the LRC submit the rules to the Administrative Regulation Review
Subcommittee for determinations as to whether the rules conformed to the statutory
authority under which they were promulgated and as to whether they furthered the
legislative intent.128
Although finding the adoption of administrative rules within the constitutional
purview of the executive branch of government, the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that the review of such rules to determine if they comport with statutory authority and
if they carry out the legislative intent was a judicial function.129 As a result, the court
concluded that the agency rule review scheme was an unconstitutional violation of
separation of powers. 130
121. Id. at 560, 431 A.2d at 788.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 557, 431 A.2d at 786.
124. Id. at 559, 431 A.2d at 787.
125. Id., 431 A.2d at 787-88 ("Far from violating the separation of powers doctrine, the proposed statute actually
buttresses the underlying delegation of rulemaking authority by restricting the extent to which the executive branch can
engage in unilateral lawmaking.").
126. Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
127. Ky. Rav. STAT. § 13.085(1) (1972), repealed by 1984 Ky. Acts 1117.
128. Ky. REV. STAT. § 13.087(4) (1972), repealed by 1984 Ky. Acts 1118.
129. Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 919 (Ky. 1984). See also Immigration and
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959-67 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring), supra text accompanying notes
69-72. Cf. Rankin-Thoman, Inc. v. Caldwell, 42 Ohio St.2d 436, 329 N.E.2d 686 (1975), infra text accompanying notes
137-41.
130. Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 919 (Ky. 1984).
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V. LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES IN OHIO
The Ohio General Assembly's initial legislative foray into the morass of an
ever-expanding state bureaucracy was the enactment of the Ohio Administrative
Procedure Act in 1943.131 The Act provided a uniform procedure for administrative
agencies to perform their two primary functions: the promulgation and amendment of
rules, or "quasi-legislative" action; 32 and the enforcement of these rules through
"quasi-judicial" action. 33 The Act also granted the judiciary appellate jurisdiction
over both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial agency actions.t14 Thus, the legislature
clearly viewed judicial review as the appropriate check on bureaucratic excess by the
executive branch.
Several decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court, however, construed provisions of
the Ohio Constitution that grant courts of common pleas jurisdiction over "proceed-
ings of administrative officers and agencies"' 35 as limiting the courts' jurisdiction to
the review of quasi-judicial agency action. 136 In Rankin-Thoman v. Caldwell,137 the
court concluded that the sole purpose and effect of the section of the Ohio
Administrative Procedure Act that permitted judicial review of the adoption,
amendment, or recission of administrative rules138 was to permit judicial review of
quasi-legislative proceedings. 139 In light of the precedent proscribing judicial review
of agency promulgation and amendment of rules, 140 that section of the Act was
declared unconstitutional. 141
Rankin-Thoman sparked legislative concern that agency rulemaking decisions
could go completely unchecked. In response, the state's first legislative veto
provision, House Bill 257, was passed by the Ohio General Assembly and became
effective on October 10, 1977, after going unsigned by the Governor.14 2 As a result,
131. 1943 Ohio Laws 358 (codified as amended at Owo Rev. Coos ANN. §§ 119.01-.12 (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986)).
See generally Note, A Survey of the Ohio Administrative Procedures Act, 22 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 320 (1973); Note, A
Comparative Analysis of the Federal and Ohio Administrative Procedure Acts, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 365 (1955).
132. See Omio REv. CODE Am. § 119.03 (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986) (requiring mlemaking agencies to hold a public
hearing prior to the adoption of rules and to provide public notice for such hearings).
133. See Omo R v. CODE Arm. § 119.06 (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986) (making most agency adjudication orders valid
only when an opportunity for a hearing is afforded prior to the adjudication order).
134. See Oiuo REv. Cos ANN. § 119.11, repealed by 1975 Ohio Laws 2399. Section 119.11 stated in part:
Any person adversely affected by an order of an agency .. .may appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of
Franklin County on the grounds that said agency failed to comply with the law in adopting, amending,
rescinding, publishing, or distributing said rule, or that the role as adopted or amended by the agency is
unreasonable or unlawful or that the rescission of the rule was unreasonable or unlawful.
1943 Ohio Laws 358, 365. See also Oino REv. Coos ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986) (permitting any party
adversely affected by an agency adjudication order to appeal the order in a court of common pleas).
135. Oulo CONSr. art. IV, § 4(B).
136. See DeLong v. Board of Ed., 36 Ohio St.2d 62, 303 N.E.2d 890 (1973); Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor
Control Comm'n, 34 Ohio St.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 261 (1973); M.J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio St.2d 150, 290
N.E.2d 562 (1972); Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970); and Zangerle v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St.
563, 41 N.E.2d 387 (1942).
137. 42 Ohio St.2d 436, 329 N.E.2d 686 (1975).
138. See supra note 134.
139. Rankin-Thoman, Inc. v. Caldwell, 42 Ohio St.2d 436, 438, 329 N.E.2d 686, 688 (1975).
140. See supra note 136.
141. Rankin-Thoman, Inc. v. Caldwell, 42 Ohio St.2d 436, 438, 329 N.E.2d 686, 688 (1975).
142. 177 Ohio Laws 2230. In the previous general assembly, a similar measure had been approved with
overwhelming support in both the House of Representatives (86 to 1), 136 Omo House J. 670 (1975); and the Senate (24
to 7), 136 Omo SENATE J.1159 (1975). The legislation, however, was vetoed by the governor as obliterating the historical
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Ohio became the thirty-fourth state in the nation to enact a statute granting the
legislative branch responsibility for oversight of the promulgation, amendment, and
rescission of agency rules.143
House Bill 257 created the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review
(JCARR), 144 which was designed to vest the Ohio General Assembly with more
control over the substance of rules promulgated by administrative agencies. Under the
statutory framework originally outlined in House Bill 257 and refined through
subsequent amendments, state agencies' 45 are required to file proposed rules with
JCARR at least sixty days before their scheduled adoption.146 After conducting a
hearing, JCARR may recommend the passage of a concurrent resolution invalidating
the proposed rule or any part thereof.147 Such a recommendation requires affirmative
votes from six of the ten members of the committee. 148
A recommendation for the passage of a concurrent resolution must be specifi-
cally based upon one of three grounds: (1) the rulemaking agency has exceeded the
scope of its statutory authority; (2) the proposed rule conflicts with an existing rule
adopted by the same or a different agency; or (3) the proposed rule conflicts with the
legislative intent in enacting the statute under which the agency offered the rule. 149
These standards are intended to limit legislative review to serious rulemaking abuses
by the agencies and to prevent the General Assembly from engaging in purely
political rule review. 150
If both houses of the legislature follow the recommendation of JCARR and
approve a concurrent resolution, the agency may not promulgate any similar rule for
the remainder of that session of the General Assembly. 151 If the legislature fails to
pass a concurrent resolution within sixty days after the rule was originally filed with
JCARR, the agency may adopt the rule as proposed.' 52
Since its inception in January 1978, JCARR has reviewed an estimated 25,000
proposed rules. 153 When comments and concerns are raised by JCARR, members of
the legislature, or the general public, agencies typically prefer to revise, refile, or
withdraw the rules rather than risk JCARR's recommendation of a concurrent
distinction between the administrative function of the executive branch and the lawmaking function of the legislature.
Governor's Veto Message, 136 Owo House J. 2042 (Nov. 12, 1975). An attempt to override the governor's veto was
successful in the House, 136 Owo HoUSE J. 2042 (1975), but failed in the Senate, 136 Owo SENATE J. 2372 (1975).
143. 1983 Staff Report for the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review, obtained from the Joint Committee on
Agency Rule Review, Columbus, Ohio [hereinafter Staff Report].
144. Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 101.35 (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986).
145. "Agency" is defined as any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or
commission of the state government authorized by law to adopt, amend, or rescind rules, unless otherwise specifically
provided. Orno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01(A), 119.02 (Page 1984 & Supp. 1985).
146. Owo REv. CODE AsN-. § 119.13(B) (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986).
147. Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.03(1) (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986).
148. Owo REv. CODE Are. § 101.35 (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986). The committee consists of five members of the
House of Representatives, as appointed by the speaker, and five members of the Senate, as appointed by the president.
Not more than three members from each house may be of the same political party.
149. Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.03() (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986).
150. Vierow, The General Assembly's New Role in Agency Rule-Making, 51 Owo BAR Ass'N REP. 318, 319 (1978).
151. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.03(1) (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986).
152. Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.03(f)) (Page 1984 & Supp. 1986).
153. Interview with Philip E. Cole, Executive Director of the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review, in
Columbus, Ohio (January 6, 1987).
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resolution.154 In fact, the Ohio General Assembly has invalidated only seven rules
since 1978.155
VI. THE VIABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE REVIEW IN OHIO
In declaring legislative veto provisions unconstitutional, courts have relied upon
two grounds: the failure of a legislative act to comply with the formal requirements
for enactment; 156 and the infringement by one branch upon the activities of a
coordinate branch in violation of separation of powers principles.157 Yet neither
ground requires Ohio courts to reach the same conclusion when evaluating the
constitutionality of Ohio's legislative veto mechanism.
A. Presentment and Bicameralism Concerns
According to the reasoning of the Chadha majority, 58 every exercise of power
by the legislature must comport with the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment 5 9 unless specifically excepted by the Constitution. 60 Yet this approach
is misguided for three reasons.
First, the definition of legislative act employed in Chadhal6 and adopted by
several state courts' 62 is fundamentally flawed. As mentioned earlier, the character-
istic "altering legal rights" does not distinguish in a functional sense actions of the
legislature from those of coordinate branches. 163 In fact, the characteristic is
significant only in the context of the antiquated doctrine of absolute nondelegation.1 64
As a practical matter, however, this doctrine is incompatible with the modem world
in which government is looked upon for solutions to an increasing number of pressing
economic and social issues. If Ohio's administrative agencies are prohibited from
exercising any discretion in implementing legislative policy, the General Assembly
would be forced to legislate with overwhelming specificity. Moreover, the General
154. Staff Report, supra note 143.
155. Id. (Rules 5101:1-33-03 and 06 of the Department of Public Welfare (Senate vote: 32-0, April 3, 1979; House
vote: 92-0, April 4, 1979); Rule 3901-1-14 of the Department of Insurance (House vote: 72-18, September 29, 1981;
Senate vote: 25-7, October 6, 1981); Rule 5101:2-31-07 of the Public Welfare (Senate vote: 31-0, September 8, 1982;
House vote: 93-0, September, 8, 1982); Rules 4101:2-4-01 and 4101:2-14-09 of the Board of Building Standards (Senate
vote: 29-4, November 10, 1982; House vote: 80-0, November 10, 1982); part of section (D)(1)(b) of Rule 5101:2-33-04
of the Department of Public Welfare (Senate vote: 33-0, January 3, 1983; House vote: 92-0, January 3, 1983)).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68, 91-102.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59, 69-72, 103-30.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
159. See OIHO CONST. art. 11, § 15(A) ("[N]o bill shall be passed without a concurrence of a majority of the members
elected to each house."); Otuo Cossr. art. H, § 15(E) ("Every bill which has passed both houses of the general
assembly . . . shall be presented forthwith to the governor for his approval.").
160. Two provisions of the Ohio Constitution permit the exercise of legislative power without resort to presentment
and bicameralism. See Oweo CoNsr. art. H, § 8 ("Each House has all powers necessary . . . to obtain, through
committees or otherwise, information affecting legislative action under consideration or in contemplation, . . . and to
that end to enforce the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books and papers."); Orno Coxsr.
art. H1, § 23 ("The house of representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment .... Impeachments shall be tried
by the senate. ... ).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94, 96, 101.
163. See supra text accompanying note 82.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
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Assembly's ability to compromise, by using generalities in order to accommodate
opposition, would be severely restricted. As a result, the legislature's responsiveness
to issues of concern to the general populace would be severely diminished. The
reinvigoration of the doctrine of absolute nondelegation, therefore, would represent
a political choice to reduce government effectiveness. 165
Moreover, Ohio courts have recognized that strict adherence to absolute
nondelegation would result in abortive government.166 While one branch's powers
should not be directly or completely administered by either of the other branches,1 67
the limited delegation of powers has been approved as a matter of public exigency.168
Thus, the rejection of a restrictive definition of legislative acts promotes government
efficiency and maintains the traditional relationship in Ohio between the coordinate
branches of government.
Second, the contention that all exercises of power by the legislature must comply
with presentment and bicameralism unless specifically excepted by the constitution is
a gross oversimplification.169 There are several instances in which legislative power
is permissibly exercised outside the scriptures of presentment and bicameralism. For
example, in conducting investigations affecting legislative action, each house of the
legislature as well as individual committees have authority to subpoena witnesses and
to require the production of books, papers, and records, to administer oaths to
witnesses, to punish witnesses for contempt, to provide immunity for witnesses, and
to reimburse witnesses for mileage and fees.170 Clearly, therefore, not all actions
taken by the Ohio General Assembly must comply with the presentment and
bicameralism requirements.
In addition, the Ohio General Assembly has the recognized authority to review
agency rules without resort to presentment and bicameralism.17 1 Although the
exercise of legislative power in Ohio is restricted to situations in which the "public
safety, public interest, or public convenience shall demand it, ' ' 172 the legislature has
165. See Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 1205.
166. See Bogen v. Clemner, 125 Ohio St. 186, 180 N.E. 710 (1932).
[It always has been and always will be the policy of our government, national and state, to keep distinct and
separate our legislative, judicial and executive departments of government, so that each may operate as a check
and balance upon the other, but government would prove abortive if it were attempted to follow such policy to
the letter. State agencies and public officials, regardless of classification, could not function if this rule were
strictly followed . ...
Id. at 189, 180 N.E. at 711.
167. See State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 120 Ohio St. 464, 473, 166 N.E. 407, 410 (1929) ("The
essential principle underlying the policy of the division of powers of government into three departments is that powers
properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other
departments .... ").
168. See Ex parte Bevan, 126 Ohio St. 126, 184 N.E. 393 (1933).
It would not be necessary to go beyond the confines of Ohio to find scores of instances where in one branch of
government has been invested with the powers of another. This departure [from the doctrine of absolute
nondelegation] had to be made as a matter of public exigency.
Id. at 135, 184 N.E. at 397.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
170. Owo REv. Coos AN. §§ 101.41-.46 (Page 1984).
171. See Note, Legislative Veto in Ohio: The "Twilight Zone of Distinction," 9 U. DATos L. REv. 557, 578-79
(1984).
172. Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622, 686 (1853).
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the constitutional authority under this "police power" to confer quasi-legislative
power upon an agency. 173 The only limitation upon the legislature's power to
delegate authority to administrative agencies is that the statutes contain "specific
guidelines," thereby preventing the agency from exercising the "whole power" of
the legislature. 174 Since the authority to oversee the promulgation of agency rules is
within the specific guidelines requirement, legislative review of agency rulemaking
simply implements the constitutional requirements mandated when the legislature
delegates authority to an administrative agency. 175
It has been suggested, however, that legislative invalidation of agency rules is
an impermissible violation of Ohio's presentment clause. 176 The contention is that the
invalidation of an agency rule by concurrent resolution is tantamount to amending or
repealing an existing statute without presentment to the governor. 177 It is also claimed
that the definition of a joint resolution under article II of Ohio's Constitution, as it has
been interpreted by the judiciary, precludes the General Assembly from taking
legislative action by adopting a joint resolution. 178
This argument assumes, however, that agency rules have the full force and effect
of law in Ohio from the moment of promulgation. In fact, agency rules do not take
effect until sixty days after the rule was originally filed with JCARR. 179 Between the
time they are filed with JCARR and the end of the sixty-day period, the rules have
no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, equating the invalidation of an agency rule with the
amendment or repeal of an existing statute is totally inappropriate. 180 Indeed,
"invalidation" is a misnomer; "denied effectiveness" is a more appropriate term for
the effect of a concurrent resolution's adoption.
The final reason for rejecting the approach of the Chadha majority is that the
Ohio procedure for the promulgation and review of agency rules furthers the
underlying functions of the presentment and bicameralism requirements. These
functions are protecting the executive branch from intrusions by the legislature;
protecting the people from imprudent laws; and ensuring the exercise of legislative
173. See Note, supra note 171, at 579. The public necessity of allowing the coordinate branches of government to
function efficiently implicates the police power. A statute enacted under this police power is presumed to be
constitutional, unless its enactment encroaches upon the express constitutional authority of another branch of government.
See State ex rel Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967). Since the executive
branch does not possess any express constitutional quasi-legislative authority, legislative review of agency rules is
constitutional.
174. See Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d 635 (1944).
[L]egislative acts granting to a board or an administrative agency quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power, have
been uniformly sustained where the General Assembly has laid down the policy and established the standards
while leaving to an administrative agency the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the
determination of facts to which the legislative policy is to apply.
Id. at 342, 55 N.E.2d at 635.
175. See Note, supra note 171, at 579.
176. Id. at 579-80.
177. Id. at 580.
178. Id. See also Otuo CONST. art. II, § 15(F) ("Every joint resolution which has been adopted in both houses of the
general assembly shall be signed by the presiding officer of each house to certify that the procedural requirements for
adoption have been met .... "); Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. State er rel. Atty. Gen., 85 Ohio St. 251, 97
N.E. 967 (1912) (a joint resolution may only be used in an advisory function).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 144-52.
180. See also supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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power only after two separate opportunities for study and debate.1 8 1 In Ohio, the
executive branch does not possess any independent or inherent constitutional
authority over the quasi-legislative activity of rulemaking; agencies can only exercise
those powers conferred by the legislature. 182 Thus, the legislature's decision that the
agency has exceeded the scope of its statutory authority or that the proposed rule
conflicts either with an existing rule or with the underlying legislative intent 83 is no
more an intrusion into executive branch functions than an amendment or repeal of the
enabling statute, reductions in agency budgets, or disapproval of prospective exec-
utive appointments. 84
Furthermore, Ohio's rule review process is explicitly designed to facilitate
public involvement and participation in the promulgation, amendment, and rescission
of agency rules.185 The special expertise in the complex area of rulemaking acquired
by members of JCARR also protects the public. In addition, the effectiveness of a
proposed agency rule will be postponed only upon action by both houses of the
General Assembly.' 86 Moreover, the statute establishing Ohio's procedure for
legislative review of agency rules was enacted in accordance with the presentment
requirement. ' 87
B. Separation of Powers
Although the Ohio Constitution does not contain an express provision forbidding
one branch of government from exercising powers essential to the other branches, 88
the constitution's specific allocation of powers to each branch of government reflects
a purpose that the powers and duties of each branch should be separate. 189
Furthermore, the Ohio Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that the doctrine of
separation of powers is implied in the Ohio Constitution. 90
Yet the separation of powers in Ohio has not been a static or rigid doctrine; over
time it has reflected varying shifts in influence among the branches.' 9' In general,
181. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
182. See In re Milton Hardware Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 157, 160, 250 N.E.2d 262, 265 (1969) ("An administrative
agency can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as conferred upon it by the constitution or statute which created
it or vested it with such power.").
183. See supra text accompanying note 149.
184. See supra text accompanying note 3.
185. See supra note 132 and text accompanying note 154.
186. See supra text accompanying note 151.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
188. Cf. W. VA. CoNw. art. V, § I ("The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and
distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others .... .
189. See State ex rel. Montgomery v. Rogers, 71 Ohio St. 203, 73 N.E. 461 (1905).
Mhe fact that these governmental powers have been severally distributed by the constitution to the legislature,
executive, and judicial departments of our state government, clearly evidences a purpose that the powers and
duties of each shall be separate from and independent of the powers and duties of other co-ordinate branches.
Id. at 216-17, 73 N.E. at 462.
190. See, e.g., Fairview v. Giffee, 73 Ohio St. 183, 76 N.E. 865 (1905); City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. &
Tel. Co., 64 Ohio St. 67, 59 N.E. 781 (1901).
191. When Ohio was a territory, an appointed territorial governor ruled with absolute veto power over a territorial
legislature. Under the state's first constitution, adopted in 1802, executive, legislative, and judicial powers were vested
in different departments--the legislature having superior powers, the judiciary significant authority, and the executive
very slight powers. Ohio's second constitution, adopted in 1851, drastically curbed the power of the legislature, enhanced
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influence among the branches has varied depending upon one of two factors. The first
has been the need to control the power of the respective branches in order to prevent
the concentration of power in any one branch. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, the basis
of all free government is that "the powers of government should be so divided and
balanced among several bodies of magistry, as that no one could transcend their legal
limits, without being effectively checked and restrained by the others. ' 192 The
second factor has been the allocation of governmental powers to facilitate the
effective operation of the state's political machinery.1 9 3
These underlying interests are not threatened by Ohio's procedure for legislative
review of agency rules. The restrictive nature of Ohio's procedure precludes the
concentration of power in the hands of the legislature. The Ohio General Assembly
must base any exercise of oversight power upon explicit statutory standards. 194 Thus,
the Ohio legislature lacks the sweeping "revoke at will" power found objectionable
in other contexts. 195
Moreover, legislative review of agency rule promulgation is necessary in Ohio
in order to prevent excessive concentration of power in the executive branch. As a
result of the series of Ohio Supreme Court decisions ending with Rankin-Thoman, 196
the judiciary only has jurisdiction over agency adjudications; it may not review
agency rulemaking decisions. If the legislature is barred from review as well, the
executive would be vested with considerable lawmaking power, since each promul-
gated rule would have the full force and effect of law, and would also be beyond
review by either coordinate branch. Such an allocation of governmental power would
clearly be in violation of the separation of powers principle. 197
Furthermore, the current procedure for legislative review of agency rulemaking
decisions promotes governmental efficiency. The delegation to administrative agen-
cies of authority to promulgate rules permits the Ohio General Assembly to avoid
becoming bogged down in policy details and instead to rely upon the technical
expertise of agencies. Moreover, the legislative review of agency rulemaking
decisions invests the process with political accountability. Without some oversight,
the "headless fourth branch of government" would have authority to legislate at will,
free from any political restraints. 198
the independence of the judiciary, and left the executive largely a figurehead. Under an amendment approved in 1912,
the governor was granted veto power, legislative powers were checked by the executive veto and by the reservation to the
people of the right to enact laws through initiative and referendum, and the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional
was somewhat restricted. For a more thorough review of the historical development of the Ohio Constitution, see
Woodbridge, A History of Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Study in Administrative Law, 13 U. Cm. L. Rav. 191 (1939).
192. T. JEFFERisoN, om oN aM STATE OF VsInuA 120 (W. Peden ed. 1955).
193. See Note, supra note 171, at 574-75.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
196. 42 Ohio St.2d 436, N.E.2d 686 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 135-41.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90, 192.
198. Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Re-examination, 46 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 351, 353
(1978).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In evaluating the constitutionality of Ohio's procedure for legislative review of
agency rules, Ohio courts should be wary of following lockstep the reasoning of those
courts that have held other legislative veto provisions unconstitutional. One basis for
these holdings has been the characterization of the exercise of such a veto as a
legislative act and thus subject to the constitutional requirements of presentment and
bicameralism. Yet this characterization is problematic. The definition of legislative
act used in reaching these conclusions is functionally inadequate and also has the
undesirable result of resurrecting the doctrine of absolute nondelegation. Further-
more, not all actions of the legislature must comport with presentment and
bicameralism. Moreover, the exercise of a legislative veto is not the equivalent of the
promulgation of a rule by an administrative agency. Agency rules are valid only to
the extent they comply with the underlying legislative grant of authority just as
statutes are valid only to the extent they comply with the constitution. The legislative
review of agency rules in Ohio, therefore, is more closely analagous to judicial
review of statutes.
The other basis for finding legislative veto provisions unconstitutional has been
the separation of powers principle. Yet before rushing headlong down the path that
courts in other jurisdictions have blazed, Ohio courts should pause to consider Ohio's
distinguishing considerations. The Ohio procedure for legislative review is unique in
its structure. The legislature is not empowered with broad "revoke at will" authority.
Instead, discrete and finite circumstances have been articulated in which the
legislature may preclude agency rules from taking effect. In addition, the Ohio
Supreme Court has held that judicial review of agency rulemaking decisions is
unconstitutional. Without legislative oversight of the promulgation of rules by
administrative agencies, the executive branch would acquire inordinate powers. The
present system for review of agency rules offers a needed measure of control over the
"headless fourth branch of government." Ohio courts need not, indeed should not,
follow the course laid down by other courts and declare Ohio's legislative veto
procedure unconstitutional.
William J. Pohlman
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